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Most Real Business Cycle models have a hard time jointly explaining the twin facts of strongly
pro-cyclical Solow residuals and extremely low correlations between wages and hours. We present
a model that delivers both these results without using exogenous variation in total factor produc-
tivity (technology shocks). The key innovation of the paper is to add learning-by-doing to ﬁrms
technology. As a result ﬁrms optimally vary their prices to control the amount of learning which in
turn inﬂuences future productivity. We show that exogenous variation in labour wedges (preference
shocks) measured from aggregate data deliver around ﬁfty percent of the standard deviation in the
eﬃciency wedge (Solow residual) as well as realistic second moments for key aggregate variables
which is in sharp contrast to the model without learning-by-doing.
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31 Introduction
While the neoclassical growth model has proved to be an extremely eﬀective tool for cap-
turing the basic features of business cycles, two major areas of weakness have been identiﬁed in
the literature, in terms of the ability of the model to capture the dynamics of the aggregate data.
These problems have been elegantly re-interpreted in terms of “wedges” in the equations of the
model in a recent paper by Chari et al. (2007). In an accounting exercise, the authors show that
the wedges embedded in the hours ﬁrst order condition and in the production technology, are es-
sential for “explaining” the bulk of the movement seen in aggregate US data. In the business cycle
literature, these wedges have been interpreted in the past as exogenous “shocks” which are the
source of ﬂuctuations. These interpretations of the two wedges as preference shocks and technology
shocks respectively have been controversial, not least because they assume rather than explain a
large fraction of the variation in the aggregate data. In this context, a number of authors have
attempted to develop models that produce ﬂuctuations in the labour wedge and account for a part
of the movement in the eﬃciency wedge1. However much more work remains to be done in this
area. As pointed out by Chari et al. (2007), “... our results suggest that future theoretical work
should focus on developing models which lead to ﬂuctuations in eﬃciency and labor wedges. Many
existing models produce ﬂuctuations in labor wedges. The challenging task is to develop detailed
models in which primitive shocks lead to ﬂuctuations in eﬃciency wedges as well.”2. The goal of
this paper is to take a step in this direction.
Unlike most business cycle models, there are no exogenous movements in technology in our
model. Instead, we rely on movements in the labour wedge to induce ﬂuctuations in aggregate
1 See the discussion and references in King & Rebelo (1999).
2 See Chari et al. (2007), p 828.
4variables, and the general equilibrium structure of the model to generate dynamic correlations
between these variables. We show that when ﬂuctuations in the labour wedge are fed into a
prototypical real business cycle model, it is unable to account for many of the key features of the
data. However, when they are fed into our model it does quite well. In particular, the model does a
good job of explaining ﬂuctuations in the eﬃciency wedge (essentially the Solow residual) whereas
the prototypical model would generate no endogenous ﬂuctuations. These results are achieved with
a simple modiﬁcation to a standard real business cycle model: the presence of learning-by-doing
eﬀects in ﬁrm’s technology which act as an endogenous propagation mechanism, converting shocks
to the labour wedge into persistent movements in total factor productivity and output.
There is a large empirical literature documenting the pervasive inﬂuence of learning-by-
doing in productive activities. Recent studies include Bahk & Gort (1993), Irwin & Klenow (1994),
Jarmin (1994), Benkard (2000), Thompson (2001), Thornton & Thompson (2001), Cooper & Johri
(2002), and Clarke (2007). These studies ﬁnd that agents and organizations appear to become
more productive as they gain experience at producing a particular product or service. A number
of these studies also report spillover eﬀects in learning across similar products, both within and
across ﬁrms. Since there is evidence in favour of both internal and external learning-by-doing, and
there is some controversy around which one is empirically more important, we look at both types
of learning models and ﬁnd that the results are not only qualitatively similar, the quantitative
diﬀerences are quite small at the aggregate level.
There exist a small number of papers that introduce learning-by-doing into dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium business cycle models. Both Cooper & Johri (2002) and Chang et al. (2002)
emphasize the ability of learning-by-doing to propagate shocks. In the former study, a represen-
tative consumer has access to a production technology with learning eﬀects. The latter oﬀers a
5speciﬁc decentralization in which workers learn and accumulate human capital. Our model oﬀers a
diﬀerent decentralization in which ﬁrms accumulate production related knowledge but workers do
not3. Firms in our model operate in a market with monopolistic competition and therefore have
the power to set prices. None the less, our model is quite close to Cooper & Johri (2002) in that it
directly borrows the way in which learning eﬀects are introduced into the production technology4.
As shall be clear later, these changes have a number of novel implications. The pricing decision
facing these ﬁrms becomes dynamic because raising current prices lowers current production and
learning which lead to future productivity decreases. Moreover, when ﬁrms are aware that they
can learn and build up knowledge, price-cost markups can vary endogenously in an environment
where they would be constant in the absence of learning-by-doing. In this sense, the model may be
viewed as a new theory of time varying markups. These features are absent in the earlier papers.
In contrast to our model, those models imply that labour supply is dynamic. The implications of
dynamic labour supply are discussed more fully in Johri & Letendre (2007). While we believe that
learning by workers is an important phenomenon, we choose to ignore it in this study in order to
focus on the new implications of incorporating ﬁrm level learning in business cycle models.
Simulations from a linearized version of the model calibrated to US data show that sub-
stantial improvements to the existing literature can be achieved in terms of matching the usual set
of “key” second moments. For example, the model can deliver a small positive correlation between
average labour productivity and hours which has eluded most current business cycle models, either
3 There is considerable evidence that organizations accumulate intangible capital which is speciﬁc to the organization.
Some (though not all) aspects of this are related to learning-by-doing. Recent attempts to quantify diﬀerent aspects
of organizational capital under varying names can be found in Brynjolfsson & Hitt (2000), Hall (2000), Lev &
Radharkrishnan (2003), and Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) and the references therein.
4 This paper also diﬀers in that business cycles are not generated by technology shocks.
6real or monetary. Moreover, the model generates a highly volatile and persistent eﬃciency wedge
(Solow residual). Depending on the speciﬁcation, we can account for around forty to ﬁfty percent
of the actual volatility in the eﬃciency wedge and over eighty percent of the movement in aggre-
gate output, hours, consumption and investment. These results are obtained with fairly modest
learning eﬀects. In sharp contrast the results from the model without learning-by-doing are quite
unrealistic: average labour productivity is negatively correlated with both output and hours5. In
addition, investment and hours are too volatile relative to output. Moreover the model explains
none of the volatility in the eﬃciency wedge and only sixty seven percent of the volatility in output.
Unfortunately, while the simulated markups are time varying, the volatility is quantitatively too
small to account for actual markup variations over the business cycle.
The next two sections of the paper presents the two models of learning-by-doing in order
of decreasing complexity starting with the internal learning model. Section four presents results
from simulating linearized versions of the model calibrated to the U.S. economy. The ﬁnal section
concludes.
2 A Decentralization of the Internal Learning Model
The model presented below oﬀers a decentralization of the Cooper & Johri (2002) model.
A common feature of both models is that learning occurs as a by-product of production. The key
diﬀerence occurs in who gets to learn. In Cooper & Johri (2002), learning occurs at the household
level while in the current model it is intermediate goods ﬁrms which learn by accumulating pro-
5 This counter-cyclical (and counter-factual) movement in average labour productivity has long troubled models of the
business cycle driven by aggregate demand disturbances. See Rotemberg & Woodford (1991, 1999) for a discussion
of the various attempts to overcome these problems.
7duction related knowledge which we will refer to as organizational capital. These ﬁrms operate in
a market with monopolistic competition which gives them the power to choose prices6. The ﬁrms
control how much they wish to learn by varying the markup of price over marginal cost to maximize
the present discounted value of proﬁts. Since the behaviour of consumers is standard, we discuss
ﬁrms ﬁrst.
Final and Intermediate Goods Producers
There are a large number of producers operating in a competitive industry that produce
a ﬁnal good Yt using the following technology that converts intermediate goods Qt(i) indexed by








Each period these ﬁrms choose inputs Qt(i) for all i ∈ [0,1], and output Yt to maximize proﬁts.
The conditional demand for each intermediate input Qt(i) that emerge from this exercise are:
f (vt(i),Yt) = vt(i)
µ
1−µ Yt (2)
where vt(i) is the relative price charged by the ith intermediate goods producer. The price elasticity
of demand, faced by intermediate goods producer i, will be given by µ/(1 − µ). A zero proﬁt
condition ties down the price charged by the ﬁnal goods producer Pt as a function of intermediate
good prices.
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers, indexed by the letter i that operate in
a monopolistically competitive economy. Each such producer produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate
6 The model outlined below takes the standard Blanchard & Kiyotaki (1987) model of monopolistic competition,
commonly used in aggregate general equilibrium models, modiﬁed to allow for the accumulation of organizational
capital. Neither Cooper & Johri (2002) nor Chang et al. (2002) include this feature.
8good Q(i) according to the following production technology:
Qt(i) = F [Kt(i),Zt(i),Ht(i)] = Kt(i)θ Ht(i)α Zt(i)ε 0 < α, θ, ε < 1 (3)
where organizational capital Z(i) is combined with physical capital K(i) and labour H(i) to produce
output Q(i). The technology diﬀers from a standard neo-classical production function because
the ﬁrm carries a stock of organizational capital which is an input in the production technology.
Organizational capital refers to the information accumulated by the ﬁrm, through the process of
past production, regarding how best to organize its production activities and deploy its inputs7.
As a result, the higher the level of organizational capital, the more productive the ﬁrm8. Note
that there are diminishing returns to accumulating organizational capital, a feature often found in
empirical studies of learning-by-doing.
While learning-by-doing is often associated with workers and modeled as the accumulation
of human capital, a number of economists have argued that ﬁrms are also store-houses of knowledge.
Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) note “At least as far back as Marshall (1930, bk.iv, chap. 13.I), economists
have argued that organizations store and accumulate knowledge that aﬀects their technology of
production. This accumulated knowledge is a type of unmeasured capital distinct from the concepts
of physical or human capital in the standard growth model.” Similarly Lev & Radharkrishnan (2003)
write, “Organization capital is thus an agglomeration of technologies—business practices, processes
and designs, including incentive and compensation systems—that enable some ﬁrms to consistently
extract out of a given level of resources a higher level of product and at lower cost than other
ﬁrms.” There are at least two ways to think about what constitutes organizational capital. Some,
7 Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) model and estimate the size of organizational capital for the US manufacturing sector and
ﬁnd that it has a value of roughly 66 percent of physical capital. Although their broad interpretation of organizational
capital is similar to ours, they do not allow for depreciation of past learning.
8 Since we are focusing on movements at the business cycle frequency we ignore technical progress of any form.
9like Rosen (1972), think of it as a ﬁrm speciﬁc capital good while others focus on speciﬁc knowledge
embodied in the matches between workers and tasks within the ﬁrm. While these diﬀerences are
important, especially when trying to measure the payments associated with various inputs, we
believe they are not crucial to the issues at hand. As a result we do not distinguish between the
two.
Learning at the ﬁrm level is modeled through an accumulation equation for organizational
capital which is closely related to the empirical learning-by-doing literature in which each cumulative
unit of past production contributes equally to the creation of knowledge. Our speciﬁcation diﬀers
in that the contribution of production in any period to the current level of organizational capital is
decreasing over time. Following Cooper & Johri (2002), who provide evidence on this speciﬁcation,
we write the accumulation technology as
Zt+1(i) = Zt(i)η Qt(i)γ (4)
or




where Zt(i) denotes the stock of organizational capital available to the production unit at time t,
Z0(i) denotes the initial endowment of organizational capital and Qt(i) denotes the current level of
output. This initial stock of organizational capital constitutes the inherited knowledge of the orga-
nization which might include a common component reﬂecting the prevailing best practice systems,
structures, and procedures, and an idiosyncratic component reﬂecting more speciﬁc knowledge
imparted by the organization’s founders that becomes a durable feature of the organization.
This modiﬁcation of the traditional speciﬁcation of learning has a number of advantages.
First, it allows for the sensible idea that production knowledge may become less and less relevant
10over time as new techniques of production, new product lines and new markets emerge. Second, it
allows in a general way for the idea that some match speciﬁc knowledge may be lost to the ﬁrm as
workers leave or get reassigned to new tasks or teams within the ﬁrm. In addition, the knowledge
accumulated through production experience will be a function of the current vintage of physical
capital. The decision to replace physical capital will imply that the existing stock of organizational
capital will be less relevant. Third, it allows for the existence of a steady state in which the stock
of organizational capital is constant. In contrast, the traditional speciﬁcation in the empirical
learning-by-doing literature allows the stock of organizational capital to grow unboundedly. An
alternative way to bound learning is to assume that productivity increases due to learning occur
for a ﬁxed number of periods. While this may be appropriate for any one task or worker within
the ﬁrm, we think of the internal context of ﬁrms as an environment with an ever changing set
of tasks, workers, teams, machines and information. In this context it may be better to model
organizational capital as continually accumulating and depreciating.
The restriction η < 1 is consistent with the empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of
depreciation of organizational capital often referred to as organizational forgetting. Argote et al.
(1990) provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis of organizational forgetting associated with the
construction of Liberty Ships during World War II. Similarly, Darr et al. (1995) provide evidence
for this hypothesis for pizza franchises and Benkard (2000) provides evidence for organizational
forgetting associated with the production of commercial aircraft. One diﬀerence between these
studies and and this paper is that the accumulation technology is log-linear rather than linear.
Clarke (2006) shows that the additional curvature in this log-linear technology is unlikely to produce
predictions for aggregate variables, in response to a technology shock, considerably diﬀerent to
those associated with a linear technology. It is the implied dynamic structure associated with the
11accumulation of organizational capital, rather than any functional form assumptions that drives
the results in Cooper & Johri (2002). We expect similar results to follow in the current context9.
It is useful to dissect the problem faced by an intermediate goods producer into two stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, the producer chooses the cost minimizing quantities of labour and physical capital,




wtHt(i) + rtKt(i) | Kt(i)θ Ht(i)α Zt(i)ε ≥ Qt(i)
o
(5)
Each intermediate goods producer is assumed to operate within perfectly competitive input markets
such that the real rental price of physical capital rt and the real wage wt are taken as given. This
cost minimization problem produces conditional factor demands that are a function of factor prices,
the required level of output (Qt) and the stock of organizational capital (Zt). The cost function
(5) will be a non-increasing function of the (given) stock of organizational capital.
In the second stage, the intermediate goods producer will solve a dynamic problem that
selects the time path of output supply Qt(i), or the relative price vt(i), and the time path of
organizational capital Zt(i) that maximizes the real expected discounted present value of proﬁts,
subject to the demand function (2), the accumulation technology for organizational capital (4), and
the initial stock of organizational capital Z0(i).






Dt [vt(i) · f (vt(i),Yt) − C {wt,rt,f (vt(i),Yt),Zt(i)}]
9 Another seemingly crucial feature of our model is that organizational capital is accumulated as a by-product of
production. This ignores the considerable intentional investments made by ﬁrms in raising productivity. Hou & Johri
(2007) show that allowing for intentional investments in organizational capital result in only small diﬀerences from




given some initial stock of organizational capital Z0(i) and subject to an appropriate transversality
condition on the stock of organizational capital. Since ﬁrms are owned by households, Dt is the
appropriate endogenous discount rate for the ﬁrms10.
The solution to the (proﬁt) maximization problem will satisfy the following ﬁrst order
conditions:
























where mct(i) denotes the marginal cost of producing output Q(i). The term λ
f
t (i) denotes the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the maximization problem deﬁned above and represents the
discounted value of an additional unit of organizational capital, in terms of marginal real proﬁts.
The ﬁrst order condition (6) captures the nature of the dynamic tradeoﬀ that arises when
intermediate goods producers face a downward sloping demand curve. Fundamentally, these pro-
ducers face a tradeoﬀ between maximizing current period proﬁts and losing future productivity
increases. The ﬁrst order condition (6) determines the optimal relative price vt to be set by the
producer of the intermediate input i. Since the intermediate goods producer faces a downward
sloping demand curve for their product, raising the output price by one unit causes demand for
10Given our speciﬁcation for preferences outlined in the next section:





13their product to fall. The ﬁrst two terms in (6) captures the impact on current revenue of raising the
relative price of output vt. The third term represents the reduction in current period costs resulting
from this corresponding lower level of output. The accumulation technology for organizational cap-
ital implies that a reduction in current output will lead to a reduction in the stock of organizational
capital available in the next period. The term on the right hand side of (6) represents the value of
this reduced (future) stock of organizational capital. The term f0 (vt(i)) measures the reduction in
current output due to the higher relative price and the term ∂Zt+1/∂Qt represents the reduction in
the stock of organizational capital resulting from the reduction in current period output, evaluated
at the marginal value of organizational capital to the intermediate goods producer. The ﬁrst order
condition implies that the ﬁrm will set its optimal price by equating the current period beneﬁt
of increasing its relative price by one unit to the discounted future costs. This tradeoﬀ, captured
by the (dynamic) term on the right hand side of (6), will not appear in the standard model of
monopolistic competition, without the accumulation of organizational capital
The ﬁrst order condition (7) determines the value of an additional unit of organizational
capital for use by the producer in period t+1. This additional unit of organizational capital has a
(marginal) value, in terms of proﬁts, of λ
f
t to the producer. Since the cost function is decreasing in
the stock of organizational capital, an additional unit of organizational capital reduces the cost of
producing output level Qt+1. The accumulation equation for organizational capital implies that an
additional unit of organizational capital will increase the stock of organizational capital available
in period t + 2. This higher stock of organizational capital has a value of λ
f
t+1 to the producer.
The condition (7) implies that organizational capital will be accumulated up to the point where
the value of an additional unit of organizational capital today is equal to the discounted value of
this organizational capital next period.
14Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical, inﬁnitely lived households. At time
t, the representative household has preferences over consumption of ﬁnal goods Ct and leisure
(T − Ht) where T represents the total time endowment. The representative household maximizes
the expected discounted present value of utility by choosing consumption Ct, labour supply Ht,
and investment in physical capital It, taking as given the real wage wt and the real interest rate rt.
Consumers sell labour services and rent physical capital to the intermediate goods producers. As
owners of the intermediate goods producers, they also receive the current proﬁts of these producers.
Physical capital is stored and accumulated by consumers according to a standard accumulation
technology. The ﬂow utility of the representative household is given by:
U(Ct,T − Ht) = lnCt + Bt V(T − Ht) (8)
where:
V(T − Ht) =

         
         
1
1 − ν
(T − Ht)1−ν for ν ≥ 0 and ν 6= 1
ln(T − Ht) for ν = 1
and the term Bt evolves according to:
lnBt = (1 − ρb) ln ¯ B + ρb lnBt−1 + υbt
where υbt is an iid random variable with mean zero and standard deviation σb. Bt is the only
exogenous source of ﬂuctuations in our model. It represents the idea of the “labour wedge” explored
in Chari et al. (2007). We chose this formulation of the labour wedge over representing it as a labour
income tax because it is also consistent with the idea of preference shocks which are increasingly
15being used in business cycle models. Early references include Parkin (1988) and Baxter & King
(1991). More recently they can be found in Chang et al. (2002) which is a business cycle model
with only real shocks and Ireland (2004a, b) which have both preference and money shocks11.
An obvious question that arises in this context is what does the labour wedge represent?
Our interpretation is that this is anything that exogenously shifts the aggregate labour supply
at business cycle frequencies. Some possible sources of such shifts have been explored in the
literature. For example, if the marginal utility of leisure is a function of omitted variables such
as money balances or government spending, then variations in these might directly account for
these shifts. See Parkin (1988) for an early discussion of this point. At a deeper level one might
imagine these may be caused by changes in the amount of distortions in the economy caused by
taxation and transfer payments, unionization and other shifts in market power. See, for example,
Mulligan (2002) and Chari et al. (2002) or Cole & Ohanian (2002, 2004) for a model in which shifts
in government policy towards monopolies in a model with unions can account for these preference
shifts in the context of the Great Depression. Rotemberg & Woodford (1991, 1999) consider models
of imperfect competition in which distortions vary over the business cycle. Alternatively a model
with monetary shocks and sticky wages might account for them. Finally Hall (1997) has suggested
that these shifts might be accounted for in a labour search model where the amount of aggregate
hours spent searching for jobs varies with the cycle12.
Households own the imperfectly competitive ﬁrms and receive all (real) proﬁts earned by
11See Uhlig (2004) for the use of preference shocks in the context of an interesting model of labour hoarding involving
workplace leisure.
12There is also a literature that suggests these shifts arise as a result of ‘aggregation error’ in a model with heterogenous
agents. See Maliar & Maliar (2004), Chang & Kim (2007)
16ﬁrms. The household budget constraint then becomes:










βt [lnCt + Bt V(T − Ht)]
subject to the budget constraint and the usual transversality condition given an initial stock of
physical capital K0. The ﬁrst order conditions associated with this problem are:











[rt+1 + (1 − δ)]

(11)
where δ represents the depreciation rate for physical capital. The interpretation of these ﬁrst
order conditions is quite standard. Condition (10) requires per-capita consumption and hours be
chosen so that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, for all t, is
equal to the real wage rate. Condition (11) is the standard Euler equation for the accumulation of
physical capital which requires that, at the optimal solution, the utility cost of giving up one unit
of consumption must be equal to the present value (in terms of utility) of this unit of consumption
tomorrow.
Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
A competitive equilibrium consists of:
1. allocations Ct, Ht, Kt+1 that solve the consumer’s problem, taking prices as given
172. allocations Kit, Hit, Zi,t+1 for i ∈ [0,1] that solve the ﬁrm’s problem, taking all prices but
their own output price as given
3. allocations Yt, Qit that solve the ﬁnal goods producer’s problem, taking prices as given
4. prices wt, rt, vit for i ∈ [0,1]
In addition, these allocations must satisfy the factor market clearing conditions and the
aggregate resource constraint. Since the technology of the economy is assumed symmetric with
respect to all intermediate goods producers, attention may be restricted to the symmetric equilib-
rium where all producers in the intermediate goods sector charge the same price and produce the








so that symmetry requires the relative price vt = 1 for all ﬁrms. Since all intermediate goods
producers have the same level of technology and have the same initial endowment of organizational
capital, it will be true that Ht(i) = Ht; Kt(i) = Kt; and Zt(i) = Zt. In this case, the total demand















Using the factor market clearing conditions, the household’s budget constraint in the symmetric
equilibrium will be given by:
Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt = Yt
183 An Aggregate Model with Learning Externalities
The most direct way to discuss the impact of learning externalities is to retain all features of
the previous model except that ﬁrms no longer realize that production leads to the accumulation of
organizational capital. Instead they take as given the economy-wide stock of organizational capital
as an input in their production technologies. The obvious implication of this change in speciﬁcation
is that (7) is no longer part of the system of equations associated with equilibrium in the external
model. Secondly (6), the pricing equation, simpliﬁes to the standard condition found in models of
monopolistic competition—price is set as a ﬁxed markup over marginal cost. In other words the
term on the right hand side of equation (6) equals zero.
An alternative way to proceed is to abandon the decentralization involving monopolistic
competition and solve a representative agent model economy with external learning eﬀects built
directly into the technology. An advantage of this approach is that the model can be directly
compared to some earlier work especially the closely related model presented in Cooper & Johri
(2002). The two models then will diﬀer in only two ways. First while the agent in Cooper & Johri
(2002) internalizes the learning eﬀects built into the technology, here they will not. Second, the
source of ﬂuctuations in Cooper & Johri (2002) were technology shocks whereas here they will be
preference shocks.
The agent has preferences over consumption and leisure and has access to a Cobb-Douglas
technology that produces a consumption\investment good (Y) using three inputs: hours (H), phys-





The agent can use this good for consumption or to invest in physical capital. The speciﬁcation for
19the accumulation of physical capital is
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It (13)
where δ is the depreciation rate. The stock of organizational capital depends on past production












βt [lnCt + Bt V(T − Ht)]
subject to the aggregate resource constraint, the accumulation technology (14), the transversality
condition limt→∞ Λh
t Kt = 0 and an initial stock of physical capital K0
4 Solution Method and Calibration
An approximate linear solution, to the models outlined above, is obtained using the method outlined
in King & Watson (2002). This solution is derived by linearizing the equations characterizing the
competitive equilibrium in the neighbourhood of the steady state. It is necessary to specify values
for the discount rate β, the depreciation rate of physical capital δ, the production technology
parameters α, θ, and ε, the accumulation technology parameters γ and η, the preference parameter
ν, the persistence ρb and the volatility σb of the preference shock. In addition, for the internal
learning model, the demand parameter µ needs to be speciﬁed.
The following values for key parameters were used : δ = 0.02, β = 0.9926 and θ = 0.34.
These values imply a steady state share of investment in output of 21.57 percent and a steady state
(physical) capital to output ratio of 10.78. Previous attempts to measure the degree of returns to
20scale in the aggregate production function using instrumental variable techniques have yielded quite
a range of estimates often with large standard errors. Despite this, the consensus view (see the work
of Basu (1996) and Basu & Fernald (1997)) is that the scale elasticity measured by (α+θ) is close to
unity. Consequently, given θ = 0.34, the model is calibrated with α = (1−θ) = 0.6613. Turning to
the parameters associated with learning-by-doing, we draw on the results of Cooper & Johri (2002).
To illustrate the impact of varying the parameters associated with learning we report results for
two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the learning technology that Cooper & Johri (2002) focussed on. For
our baseline case, we set the elasticity of output with respect to organizational capital, ε = 0.264.
This value is close to manufacturing industry estimates reported in Cooper & Johri (2002) and
corresponds to a learning rate of twenty percent, commonly estimated in microeconomic studies of
learning-by-doing that do not allow past experience to become less valuable to the ﬁrm14.
Two alternative values for the parameters of the accumulation technology are considered.
The ﬁrst set (γ = 0.5 and η = 0.5) correspond to manufacturing level estimates reported in Cooper
& Johri (2002). Sensitivity analysis is conducted with a second set ( γ = 0.2 and η = 0.8 ) of values
which are based on economy-wide estimates reported in Cooper & Johri (2002). Our value for µ
13Papers in the organizational capital literature often work with decreasing returns in labour and capital. Typically
the implied capital output ratios are much lower than found in aggregate US data. Our results are not very sensitive
to this assumption.
14This value is also (broadly) consistent with industry-level and plant-level estimates in Clarke (2007), based upon
structural estimation of the ﬁrm side of the internal learning model outlined above. Note that Benkard (2000) has
argued that allowing for “organizational forgetting” leads to higher estimates of the learning rate. For example in
his work on aircraft production, the estimated learning rate rises to 39 percent once forgetting is allowed. Keeping
this in mind, and the even higher estimate of ε = .49 for the aggregate economy in Cooper & Johri (2002), it would
not be unreasonable to allow for an ε = 0.4 which corresponds to a learning rate of roughly 32 percent. Results for
this case were reported in an earlier version of the paper and are available from the authors.
21varies across speciﬁcations to deliver a constant capital output ratio and a steady state markup
of ﬁfteen per cent. We also report results for a much lower learning rate of ten percent. This
speciﬁcation sets (γ = 1 and η = 0.5) as in Cooper & Johri (2002).
While the calibration of the learning by doing parameters is based on estimates obtained in
earlier studies, it may be useful to shed further light on the importance of organizational capital in
the economy implied by these parameters. The level of organizational capital relative to output in
the economy is governed by the accumulation equation (4). Since we have assumed (for the baseline
case) constant returns to scale in this function, we end up with a steady state level of Z/Q = 1. By
contrast, the ratio of physical capital to output is around 10 and Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) report
that organizational capital is roughly 2/3 the size of physical capital, implying a Z/Q of roughly
six. Our justiﬁcation for a lower Z/Q is that we choose to focus on only one type of organizational
capital, that which is accumulated as a by-product of production through learning-by-doing. The
literature on organizational capital also emphasizes that ﬁrms intentionally invest conventional
inputs in the creation of knowledge which may be captured in estimates of organizational capital.
Finally organizational capital may also include intangibles such as “work-culture” which may have
an eﬀect on productivity. To the extent that these features do not vary over the business cycle,
their exclusion from the model should not strongly inﬂuence the results. In this context note that if
other aspects of organizational capital are not varying over the business cycle then the accumulation
equation can be modiﬁed to include a constant term:
Zt+1(i) = Z0Zt(i)η Qt(i)γ. (15)
In steady state this implies Z(i) = Z0(i)1/(1−γ) Q(i). In the current model Z0 = 1. Given
an estimate of the steady state ratio of organizational capital to output, Z0 could be calibrated
to deliver that number. However, the interesting thing to note about the level of steady state
22organizational capital is that it has little, if any, inﬂuence on the short run dynamics of the model.
A simple (albeit incomplete) way to see this is to examine the linearized version of the accumulation
equation where all lowercase variables are in deviations from steady state.
zt+1 = γzt + (1 − γ)yt (16)
Note that the level of organizational capital plays no role in it’s short run dynamics and that Z0
drops out of the equation.
An alternative way to evaluate the impact of organizational capital on the economy is to
compare the implied value for Tobin’s q in the model with the data. Empirical estimates of average
q vary quite widely. For example Barnett & Sakellaris (1999) provide an estimate of q=1.77 on
average for the manufacturing sector. This accords well with the average estimate of q=1.7 reported
in Summers et al. (1981). A much lower estimate of q=1.11 can be found in Lang & Schultz (1994).
In our model for the baseline calibration Tobin’s q is equal to 1.643 which is in between the above
estimates15.
One can also ask to what extent do ﬁrms invest in organizational capital in steady state?
The model provides an indirect answer to this question since there are no direct investments in
organizational capital by ﬁrms. However, since ﬁrms realize that producing more output yields
additional future organizational capital, they choose to produce more than they would in the ab-
sence of learning-by-doing and more also than if they did not internalize the learning technology.
How should we evaluate this additional “investment” in organizational capital? One way would be
to calculate the costs associated with the extra output produced by ﬁrms that internalize learning
eﬀects. Recall, however, that the additional output also yields revenue, albeit at a lower price.
15Business cycle models are typically calibrated to a markup of 11.11 %. The implied q is greater than 2 for a typical
calibration.
23Therefore it would appear that the best way to calculate the value of the investments in organiza-
tional capital is to calculate the diﬀerence in the steady state ﬂow of proﬁts between the internal
and external learning models. Steady-state proﬁts are 68% larger in the external learning model
as compared to the internal learning model. Attributing this diﬀerence in steady-state proﬁts to
investments in learning, the steady-investment to output ratio for organizational capital is approx-
imately 0.0359. This number may be compared to the income share of investments in intangible
capital that are broadly similar to organizational capital. Corrado et al. (2006) refer to these
as investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources. Their estimates suggest that such investments account
for approximately one third of all investments in intangible capital providing an income share of
investments in intangible ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources of 5%.
For the data under consideration, the average per-capita total hours worked per quarter is
given by approximately 300 hours per quarter16. With a calibrated total time endowment of 1369
hours per quarter, this provides average per-capita total hours, as a proportion of the total time
endowment H/T, of 21%17.
The preferences of the representative household, given by (8), imply the following inter-






The value of ν = 2.7226 was picked to deliver an inter-temporal labour supply elasticity of 1.3088
16We use aggregate US data at the quarterly frequency covering the period 1955:Q1–1992:Q4. We thank Michelle
Alexopoulos for providing this data to us.
17See Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992), Burnside et al. (1993), or Burnside & Eichenbaum (1996)
24as estimated in Chang et al. (2002)18. which is close to the upper end of estimates of the inter-
temporal labour supply elasticity using microeconomic data19.
The ﬁrst order conditions from the household’s maximization problem imply the following
relationship for the labour wedge:
lnBt = −ln Ct + ν (T − Ht) + ln(Wt)
Consequently, an (implied) series for the exogenous process may be determined using data on
consumption Ct, hours Ht, and wages Wt. This series Bt can then be used to estimate the second
moments of the process according to:
lnBt = (1 − ρb) ln ¯ B + ρb lnBt−1 + υbt
Obviously, these moments will depend upon the value of the preference parameter ν. Based upon
the data, the model with ν = 2.7226 is calibrated with ρb = 0.9536 and σb = 0.0107.
5 Simulation Results
Response to movements in labour wedge
This section presents quantitative results from simulating the calibrated linearized versions
of the learning models along with a baseline real business cycle model without learning eﬀects. We
begin with a discussion of the implications for productivity and then brieﬂy discuss the implied
second moments usually presented in the business cycle literature.
18We also explored the impact of setting ν = 1 which, together with the steady state h/T implies an inter-temporal
labour supply elasticity of 3.563. This value is commonly used in the business cycle literature. The results were
similar and are available from the authors upon request.
19See Browning et al. (1999) for a review of this literature
25σsr ρsr ρh,alp ρh,w ρw,y
US data 0.0208 0.9457 0.0828 0.1900 0.7034
No Learning 0 n/a -0.4316 -0.4316 -0.1217
20 % Learning 1 (η = 0.5) 0.0094 0.9951 0.2453 0.2487 0.6730
20 % Learning 2 (η = 0.8) 0.0084 0.9981 0.1416 0.1273 0.6039
10 % Learning (η = 0.5) 0.0103 0.9954 0.2695 0.2752 0.7042
Table 1: Productivity and Wages
Table 1 presents some key results for productivity and wages. The ﬁrst two columns contain
the standard deviation and ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the Solow residual while the next
two columns present the contemporaneous correlations of hours with average labour productivity
and wages. The ﬁnal column presents the contemporaneous correlation between output and wages.
Comparing row two of Table 1 with row one, it is clear that the baseline business cycle model,
without learning, generates results that are incompatible with US data on wages and productivity.
Not only is there no mechanism for endogenously generating movements in the Solow residual
(eﬃciency wedge), average labour productivity and wages are both highly negatively correlated
with hours while the correlations in US data are weakly positive. Similarly wages are negatively
correlated with output while they are highly positively correlated in the data.
The next three rows present results for three variants of the model with internal learning-
by-doing. Rows 3 and 4 correspond to a 20 percent learning rate (ε = 0.26) while the learning rate
in row 5 is ten percent with γ = 1 as is typical in the learning literature. Examination of these
rows reveals that all three speciﬁcations generate considerable movement in the Solow residual.
Depending on the speciﬁcation, the model can account for 40 to 50 per cent of the volatility of the
26Solow residual seen in the US data20. The model with learning also does quite well in replicating
the low positive correlation of hours with wages and average labour productivity as well as the high
positive correlation between output and wages. The results from the external learning model are
quite similar except that in general the model generates a little more endogenous movement in the
Solow residual and slightly higher correlations of productivity and wages with hours and output.
These results are presented in an appendix with no discussion.
To understand why the learning models generate a small correlation between wages (average
labour productivity) and hours it is useful to think in terms of a labour demand-labour supply
diagram. The shock causes agents to shift their labour supply curves outwards leading to an
increase in hours worked. Absent the learning channel, this would cause a movement down the
labour demand curve leading to a sharp fall in wages and labour productivity, as in the model
without learning. Once ﬁrms are allowed to learn from production, we get an oﬀsetting second
shift of the labour demand curve to the right induced by the increase in future productivity due
to the accumulation of organizational capital. The net result of the two shifts is a large movement
in hours, even if the supply curve is not very responsive to movements in the real wage, and a
small movement in labour productivity. This analysis is reminiscent of Christiano & Eichenbaum
(1992) but recall that in that model the two shifts occurred in response to two separate shocks:
a government spending shock and a technology shock whereas here the only exogenous shift is in
labour supply.
The analysis is also reminiscent of the discussion in Cooper & Johri (2002) of how the
20Obviously the amount of variation in the Solow residual will depend on how productive organizational capital is in
output production. In an earlier version of the paper we showed that even with a moderate learning rate of 32 % the
model could account for 80% of the variation in the Solow residual.
27representative agent responds to a technology shock. There, as is usual, the technology shock causes
a rightward shift in labour demand while the wealth eﬀect of the accumulation of organizational
capital is to shift the labour supply curve to the left. Once again the model delivers a lower
correlation of hours and average labour productivity than the baseline model but it also delivers
a lower movement in hours which is counter-factual. This occurs because the labour supply curve
shifts left, countering some of the rightward movement of labour demand.
Given this analysis, it is useful to compare the moments reported in Table 1 with similar
moments generated by total factor productivity (tfp) shocks instead of preference shocks21. These
are reported in Table 522. As expected, the no learning model generates too high correlations of
wages (and productivity) with hours and output. The actual values are .54 and .97 respectively.
As discussed above, the internal learning by doing models are able to lower the correlation of
wages with hours but the quantitative impact of this is small. As a result we conclude that the
performance of the learning-by-doing model with preference shocks is superior to its performance
with technology shocks.
FIGURES 1 and 2 TO BE PLACED HERE
Figures 1 and 2 present impulse response plots for the high learning model (stars) as well
as the baseline model without learning eﬀects (solid lines). The impact of learning-by-doing on
21This requires some modiﬁcation of the model outlined above. In the symmetric equilibrium, let the aggregate






t. The tfp process At evolves according to:
lnAt = (1 − ρa) ln ¯ A + ρa lnAt−1 + υat
The process is calibrated to deliver the observed autocorrelation and variance of the Solow residual (see Table 5) with
ρa = 0.9457 and σa = 0.0068.
22The value for µ varies across speciﬁcations to deliver a constant capital output ratio and a steady state markup of
ﬁfteen per cent.
28endogenous productivity movements is clearly visible in the strong hump-shaped response of the
Solow residual. As expected, absent any learning mechanism, average labour productivity falls
sharply when hours rise in the impact period and remain below steady state levels for four years.
With learning, organizational capital is built up due to above steady state output. On its own
this eﬀect increases productivity thus counteracting the negative inﬂuence of the increase in hours
worked. As a result labour productivity is below steady state for only six quarters as opposed to
fourteen quarters.
σC/Y σI/Y σH/Y ρC,Y ρI,Y ρH,Y ρY σY
US Data 0.79 1.76 0.72 0.92 0.83 0.78 0.97 0.0399
No Learning 0.78 2.79 1.10 0.94 0.86 0.95 0.97 0.0267
20 % Learning 1 (η = 0.5) 0.79 2.15 0.77 0.94 0.89 0.88 0.99 0.0358
20 % Low Learning 2 (η = 0.8) 0.81 2.05 0.80 0.95 0.89 0.87 0.99 0.0330
10 % Learning (η = 0.5) 0.80 2.12 0.74 0.94 0.89 0.88 0.99 0.0371
Table 2: Selected Second Moments
Table 2 presents selected second moments for the four models discussed above as well as
for linearly de-trended aggregate U.S. data. Each row of the table is set up as before with the ﬁrst
three columns reporting standard deviations relative to output. The next three columns report
contemporaneous correlations with output while the last two report the ﬁrst order autocorrelation
and standard deviation of output respectively. A glance at Table 2 suggests that all the models do
a reasonable job of capturing the basic features of consumption and investment over the business
cycle. As in the data, consumption, investment and hours are positively correlated with output
and consumption is less volatile than output while investment is more volatile. Looking down the
29second column one notices that learning tends to temper the relative volatility of investment which
is too high compared to the data in the baseline model without learning. This moderating inﬂuence
is clearly evident in Figure 1 where we see that investment rises by just over 2.5 percent in the
impact period without learning while the rise is just under 1.5 percent in the model with learning.
A small hump-shaped pattern is also evident in this case.
The impact of learning-by-doing shows up more starkly when we study the behaviour of
aggregate hours. The baseline model generates a very high correlation between hours and output
(0.95) which is reduced in all three speciﬁcations of the internal learning model. Similarly hours
are too volatile in the baseline model. Without learning eﬀects, the relative volatility of hours with
respect to output is 1.1 whereas this falls to around .7 with learning. This is much closer to the
US data which exhibits a relative volatility of 0.72. The last two columns of Table 2 display the
eﬀectiveness of learning-by-doing as a propagation mechanism. Not only does learning-by-doing
increase the persistence of output, it also magniﬁes the eﬀect of shocks as is evident in the increase
in the volatility of output from 0.0267 in the baseline model to roughly 0.0358 in the 20 percent
learning speciﬁcation which is about 90% of the volatility of output seen in aggregate US data. The
extra propagation eﬀect of learning-by-doing can also be seen in the strong hump-shaped response
of output in Figure 1.
The external learning model produces results that are very similar to those reported above
both qualitatively and quantitatively. Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix provides the details. Here
we quickly summarize the key diﬀerences. In general, given our speciﬁcation for the learning
parameters, the external model tends to magnify and propagate shocks more strongly. As a result,
the volatility of productivity measures, output and investment tends to be higher. For the same
reason the correlation of labour productivity and hours is somewhat higher as well.
30Turning to the behaviour of the internal learning by doing model in the presence of tech-
nology shocks. We see from Table 6 in the Appendix that the moments largely mirror the results
reported above. As widely documented in the literature, the key area of under-performance for
both the models with and without learning eﬀects is the volatility of hours. With persistent tfp
shocks, hours do not move enough.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents two business cycle models with learning-by-doing that are quite success-
ful in explaining the broad features of the US business cycle. The only shock to the economy comes
from exogenous movement in the labour wedge which we interpret as an unmodeled ﬂuctuation in
labour supply. Our models endogenously generate pro-cyclical movements in labour productivity,
wages and the Solow residual which are highly persistent and volatile. The learning-by-doing mod-
els also do well in generating a realistically small correlation between average labour productivity
(wages) and hours, an elusive goal for most business cycle models. We show that the learning
eﬀects built into these models are key aspects of this success. Absent learning, the baseline model
performs quite poorly: as expected, labour productivity is strongly counter-cyclical and there is
no movement in the Solow residual. Moreover hours and investment are too volatile relative to
output. Learning-by-doing is able to temper this excessive volatility. While the benchmark no-
learning model can account for around 67 percent of the volatility of aggregate output seen in US
data, the learning models can account for virtually all of it.
Chari et al. (2007) argue that wedges in the hours ﬁrst order condition (labour wedge)
and in the production function (eﬃciency wedge) of a prototypical real business cycle model are
key ingredients in accounting for modern business cycle ﬂuctuations. In this paper we show that
31learning-by-doing can be an eﬀective ingredient in developing an explanation of the eﬃciency wedge.
Speciﬁcally we show that exogenous movements in the labour wedge can lead to endogenous move-
ments in the eﬃciency wedge. The model can account for about ﬁfty percent of the observed
movement in the wedge.
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36Simulation Results—External Learning-by-Doing
σsr ρsr ρh,alp ρh,w ρw,y
US data 0.0208 0.9457 0.0828 0.1900 0.7034
No Learning 0 n/a -0.4316 -0.5782 -0.1217
20 % Learning 1 (η = 0.5) 0.0114 0.9960 0.2886 0.2886 0.7258
20 % Learning 2 (η = 0.8) 0.0103 0.9984 0.1967 0.1967 0.6814
10 % Learning (η = 0.5) 0.0126 0.9963 0.3104 0.3104 0.7530
Table 3: External Model: Productivity and Wages
σC/Y σI/Y σH/Y ρC,Y ρI,Y ρH,Y ρY σY
US Data 0.79 1.76 0.72 0.92 0.83 0.78 0.97 0.0399
No Learning 0.78 2.79 1.10 0.94 0.86 0.95 0.97 0.0267
20 % Learning 1 (η = 0.5) 0.84 2.31 0.72 0.97 0.87 0.87 0.99 0.0434
20 % Learning 2 (η = 0.8) 0.85 2.18 0.75 0.97 0.88 0.85 0.99 0.0343
10 % Learning (η = 0.5) 0.84 2.28 0.69 0.97 0.87 0.86 1.00 0.0384
Table 4: External Model: Selected Second Moments
37Simulation Results—Technology Shocks
σsr ρsr ρh,alp ρh,w ρw,y
US data 0.0208 0.9457 0.0828 0.1900 0.7034
No Learning 0.209 0.9457 0.5448 0.5448 0.9734
20 % Learning 1 (η = 0.5) 0.0339 0.9789 0.5312 0.5253 0.9822
20 % Learning 2 (η = 0.8) 0.0315 0.9763 0.4934 0.4872 0.9847
10 % Learning (η = 0.5) 0.0352 0.9804 0.5270 0.5203 0.9828
Table 5: Productivity and Wages
σC/Y σI/Y σH/Y ρC,Y ρI,Y ρH,Y ρY σY
US Data 0.79 1.76 0.72 0.92 0.83 0.78 0.97 0.0399
No Learning 0.76 2.97 0.27 0.93 0.86 0.72 0.96 0.0361
20 % Learning 1 (η = 0.5) 0.77 2.26 0.23 0.93 0.89 0.68 0.99 0.0549
20 % Learning 2 (η = 0.8) 0.79 2.15 0.21 0.94 0.89 0.64 0.98 0.0502
10 % Learning (η = 0.5) 0.78 2.23 0.22 0.93 0.89 0.67 0.99 0.0570
Table 6: Selected Second Moments

































































































































































Figure 1: Internal Learning-by-Doing: Selected Impulse Responses to a 1% Shock to the Labour
Wedge
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Figure 2: Internal Learning-by-Doing: Selected Impulse Responses to a 1% Shock to the Labour
Wedge
40